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Review-Interview with Stephen Gaukroger
Charles T. Wolfe *
Stephen Gaukroger’s The Natural and the Human: Science and the Shaping of
Modernity 1739-1841 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 416 p., £30.00, ISBN
9780198757634) has a much more pronounced Germanic flavor than the previous
ones, The Emergence of a Scientific Culture (2006) and The Collapse of Mech-
anism and the Rise of Sensibility (2010). If the earlier books were ‘Gaukroger
meets the Scientific Revolution’ or ‘Gaukroger meets the Enlightenment’, this one
is ‘Gaukroger meets the Two Cultures’ (or the problem of Natur- and Geisteswis-
senschaften) and moreover, Gaukroger meets Herder. Of this book and its back-
ground we have discussed with the author.
0 Stephen Gaukroger has taken his narrative of the emergence of mod-ern science and its crystallization as a source of values into new ter-ritory in this volume, the third of a planned five (or six, depending on whichPreface to which volume one reads; we’ll get back to that). In the first two vol-
umes,TheEmergence of a Scientific Culture (2006) andTheCollapse of Mechanism
and the Rise of Sensibility (2010), which went from the late Scholastic period
and the Scientific Revolution to the Enlightenment, Gaukroger, moving to a
‘macro’-level version of his influential analyses of the emergence of the natu-
ral philosopher as a persona, described how ‘science’ emerged as a generator
of cognitive values or cognitive norms. Now, in the volume under review, he
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turns to the emergence of the human sciences—in a rather dialectical narrative
in which science shifts from requiring legitimation to becoming a source of le-
gitimation. The official ‘signposts’ of The Natural and the Human are Hume’s
Treatise of HumanNature (1739) and Feuerbach’sWesen des Christentums (1841).
Indeed, this volume has a much more pronounced Germanic flavor than the
previous ones, including because it tackles topics such as ‘philosophical an-
thropology’ and the Popularphilosophen, although we also get chapters on Con-
dorcet’s social arithmetic and the decidedlymore French (indeed,moremontpel-
liérain) ‘anthropological medicine’. If the earlier books were ‘Gaukroger meets
the Scientific Revolution’ or ‘Gaukroger meets the Enlightenment’, this one is
‘Gaukroger meets the Two Cultures’ (or the problem of Natur- and Geisteswis-
senschaften) and moreover, Gaukroger meets Herder.
Some of thematerial is an extension of analyses found in the previous volume
(the shifts inmatter theory, the changeswrought upon our ontology but also our
picture of science by work on electricity) or even its predecessor (the problem
of mechanism as a project and its sometimes grandiose failures). But there is
a very new issue here: given the narrative of collapse in the previous volume,
“what kept [science] afloat between the middle of the 18ᵗʰ and the middle of the
19ᵗʰ centuries, when it began to form an intimate link with technology?” (1).
The answer lies in the naturalization of the human realm, which, Gaukroger
argues, allows for a new legitimation of the role of science. Except that
it was not the natural sciences—which had been regarded as the core of scientific activity
not just for mechanists but for all natural philosophers up to the middle decades of the
eighteenth century, especially the areas of mechanics and astronomy—but the newly
emerging human or moral sciences that now came to the fore, providing the ground
on which new scientific conceptions were forged, in the process displacing traditional
religious, humanist, and other approaches. (7)
It is important to Gaukroger’s story and to its focus on the social and human
sciences that “the natural sciences were not the only forms of naturalizing dis-
course. They did not provide the only models for naturalization, nor were they
the only naturalizing resources drawn upon” (117). Indeed, this enables him
to paint a very original and stimulating picture of what naturalization meant,
and could mean in the eighteenth century (including a contrast with the 17ᵗʰ
century’s concern with quantification).
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What does naturalization mean in Gaukroger’s vocabulary? Definitely not
Quinean naturalization or even its weaker, more pluralistic cousin, Deweyan
naturalism, in which philosophical and scientific work are allowed to modify
one another. Naturalization sensu Gaukroger is more broadly about the promo-
tion of empirical explanations: “the translation of questions that had previously
been taken as exclusively conceptual or a priori matters, and had been treated
accordingly, into a form in which empirical evidence becomes appropriate to
answering these questions” (117). And this allows him to discuss such projects
as the natural history of man, philosophical anthropology and anthropological
medicine as instances (or instantiations) of naturalization (where the medical
variant deals with nervous sensibility, while philosophical anthropology deals
with ‘cognitive sensibility’, in Gaukroger’s reconstruction), but also the Feuer-
bachian naturalization of religion into a kind of emotional / affective sphere,
expressed in the famous slogan “The true meaning of theology is anthropology”
(cit. 340); “Man was already in God, was already God himself, before God be-
cameman, i.e. showed himself as man” (cit. 341). Ultimately, “the most powerful
naturalizing resource (…) was history” (351)¹. Precisely, when naturalization is
undertaken in the human and social sciences, it is not in the name of reduc-
tive mechanics but of an integration into historical knowledge. Naturalization
and historicization come to mean much the same thing (as is observed also of
Mandeville, in Chapter 6).
Gaukroger does not leave out some of the problematic cases of ‘naturaliza-
tion of the human’ (craniology, racial theory and so on), but he does not ex-
plore the direct connection between Enlightenment materialism and ‘physical
anthropology’, which could have further supported some of his criticisms of the
former movement.² With respect to morality, the analysis of models of collec-
¹ Bohang Chen helped me see this point.
² It would be profitable to readThe Natural and the Human alongside more specialized work such
as the volume The Anthropology of the Enlightenment, edited by Larry Wolff & Marco Cipolloni
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), Justin E.H. Smith’s recent study Nature, Human Nature,
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tive behavior in Chapter 6 is interesting, although familiar to readers who have
previously encountered works such as Hont and Ignatieff’sWealth and Virtue.¹
One thought this reviewer had is that it would have been intriguing to contrast
some of the analysis of Mandeville, Rousseau, Condorcet et al. with LaMettrie’s
ethical and social theory in the Discours sur le Bonheur (or Anti-Sénèque).
The Natural and the Human shares an important feature with the influen-
tial work of Peter Hanns Reill and John Zammito: it tackles the Aufklärung
and the Lumières together (in addition to a good deal of ‘British’ material, in
Gaukroger’s case). Here, we find for instance a stimulating and rather criti-
cal discussion of Kant. Gaukroger builds on Zammito’s analysis of Kant as an
outdated, rearguard figure who actually slowed down developments in certain
crucial fields due to his commitment to a picture of science as basically Newto-
nian rational mechanics: thus chemistry and life science but also anthropology
were treated as subaltern or somehow undeserving of the title of science (200-
216).² If Kant is something of a villain in the story, then the hero (in this part
of the book, as he partly is in the discussion of myth as well) is Herder. In the
‘anthropology’ discussion, Herder is very much a hero, and as such is opposed
to a variety of other figures and positions, from Kant to materialists such as La
Mettrie, as also noted in the interview.
On the one hand, Herder’s understanding of the history of languages as a his-
&Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015),
and Aaron Garrett’s earlier survey piece “Human Nature,” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Similarly, with regard to the emergence of the human sciences, Gaukroger doesn’t discuss the
classic by Wolf Lepenies, Die drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft, 1985,
translated as Between literature and science: the rise of sociology, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1988).
¹ I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, eds, Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); see also Hont’s final collection, Jeal-
ousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).
² An interesting contrast case for Gaukroger’s position regarding Kant is what has come to be
known as the ’Lenoir thesis’, regarding Kant’s influence on Blumenbach and other major German
naturalists / biologists in the late 18ᵗʰ and early 19ᵗʰ centuries (see Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy
of Life. Teleology and Mechanism in Nineteenth Century German Biology, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982). However, Lenoir’s idea has come under major criticism in the past decades,
including from Zammito.
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tory of thought, which in turn is a history of reason, is presented by Gaukroger
as both “far more subtle” than the “‘triumph of the present’ type history of
thought offered, for example, by Diderot and D’Alembert in the preliminary
‘Discours’ to the Encyclopédie, or by Condorcet in his Esquisse,” and “far more
plausible and fruitful than the materialist reductions of the mind offered by
La Mettrie and Helvétius” (171). And with respect to the naturalization theme
running through the book, Herder’s model is described as “successful natural-
ization,” because “reductionist strategies play a far less significant role” in it
(172). Herder’s way of describing but also defending the autonomy of thought
is seen as more successful here than the rejection of reason in favour of sensi-
bility, along Rousseauian lines, or La Mettrie’s reduction of thought to a form
of physiological activity (183). Clearly, the naturalization theme is a major one
in the book, and the extent to which it can be distinguished from reductive
strategies.
On the other hand, Gaukroger contrasts Herder with Kant with respect to
their different projects, indeed, different “strategies of explanation” (208). Kant’s
attack on what he calls Herder’s hylozoism reveals, in Gaukroger’s view (and
here Zammito’s work is influential) an awkward attitude towards developments
in the life sciences. For Kant, “naturalization as a programme of explaining hu-
man behaviour is simply misconceived” (ibid.), although he does not rule out
“piecemeal and very limited forms of naturalistic explanation in the case of race
and physical geography” (ibid.). But these must be speculative ideas for Kant,
not scientific ones. In contrat, naturalization sensu Herder is “a fruitful strat-
egy”: “one can see how it might be part of a more general programme, how
it might be able to draw on a wide range of new resources, and how it might
be connected with other developments” (ibid.). Ultimately, Kant is either too
aprioristic dealing with the sciences (“For his argument to work, [Kant] needs
to align the kind of certainty that he believes derives from a priori demonstra-
tion with the kind of fundamental standing due to a discipline that explains the
behaviour of a body in terms of its material constituents. But no such align-
ment is possible,” 204) or is caught in the peculiar, perhaps never well-defined
status of his anthropology (“it is remarkable not only how poorly integrated
his anthropology is into his critical philosophy, but how little he is able to do
with it, when compared to Locke’s use of the travel literature in the first Book
of the Essay, for example, where an analogous purely practical and descriptive
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literature is used to open up deep problems for moral theory and, ultimately,
for epistemology,” 214).
The absence of Foucault—whether Gaukroger would agree or disagree with
him is another matter—is sometimes surprising, including when the book turns
to the way in which philosophical anthropology can ‘morph’ into the aestheti-
cization of life, in the final chapter. A topic that came to mind to this reviewer
but that does not seem to be discussed as such here, is ‘psychologism’, that is to
say, the articulation of naturalism and psychology. For the 19ᵗʰ century is also
the century of psychophysics and ‘naturalism’ in the form in which Husserl
denounced (as more or less synonymous with ‘psychologism’). That seems an
important episode in ‘naturalizing the human’¹—granted, this is not really a
work on the 19ᵗʰ century but it seems like a topic that could have been even
briefly discussed.
This book also has any number of useful, clear, synthetic side discussions,
which belong to the general narrative but are somehow synthetic to themselves,
like the nice discussions of Mesmerism; of the fortunes of anthropology as a
discipline (including its peculiar standing in Kant’s work); of topics from the
history of science such as Buffon on the cooling of the earth, and from ‘phi-
losophy’, such as the notion of sympathy (this is one of the rare works which
seems to explicitly tackle the relation between moral sensibility and physiolog-
ical sensitivity in the 18ᵗʰ century).
One quibble aWolffian scholar might have is the overly general discussion of
Wolffianism: “Whereas in the Wolffian tradition—and that of the German En-
lightenment, theAufklärung—reason is embodied in metaphysics, in the French
philosophe tradition reason or rationality is embodied in science” (24).Wolff also
had other systems, including a system of mathematics and current Wolffian
scholarship seems to treat his metaphysics as less aprioristic than the common
¹ See Martin Kusch, Psychologism (Routledge, 1995).
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view. Another concerns materialism, which Gaukroger describes quite strongly
as “intrinsincally implausible” (6) in its projects (why? after all, the natural his-
tory of man which he discusses favorably later on in the book was not exactly a
project foreign to Diderot). He also emphasizes that “Materialism and reduction
to the natural sciences play a very small and inessential role in the forms of nat-
uralization that shaped the transformation of the study of human psychology
and conduct into empirical disciplines in the second half of the 18ᵗʰ century”
(351), and this may be less debatable—indeed, I’m reminded of a nice comment
by Gary Hatfield about the emergence of psychology as a science, to the effect
that
In the standard narrative, the heroes of the Enlightenment arematerialists. If psychology
is to be made a science, the story goes, mind must be equated with matter and thereby
rendered subject to empirical investigation. The problem is that no one bothered to tell
the early practitioners of natural scientific psychology that they had to be materialists in
order to be natural scientific psychologists. In point of fact, of all the major 18ᵗʰ century
authors who made contributions to the development of psychology, only Erasmus Dar-
win allowed that mindmight be material; 19ᵗʰ century founders of psychology, including
Wundt, Helmholtz, Lotze, Ebbinghaus, James,Munsterberg, and Binet, banished the very
question from scientific psychology.¹
But then one might ask Gaukroger if he is providing a narrative of scientific
development. That is, it may be tricky to judge La Mettrie or Kant strictly in
terms of their belonging or not to an ‘onwards march of science’. Another, mi-
nor quibble with regards to materialism concerns Gaukroger’s insistence that
anthropological medicine was never a form of materialism (295): Cabanis, for
whom “le moral n’est que le physique considéré sous certains points de vue plus
particuliers,”² and who tried to differentiate between his, medically informed
materialism and a more naïve mechanistic materialism of the previous century,
would have disagreed.
Regardless, this is again an impressive work, which perhaps is best read with
its predecessor The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility (together,
¹ G. Hatfield, “Psychology as a Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century,” Revue de Synthèse, 115
(1994), 375-391, here, 390 (emphasis mine).
² P.-J.-G. Cabanis, Rapports du moral et du physique de l’homme (1802), XIIᵉ Mémoire, “Des tem-
péraments acquis”, 38.
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they would produce a volume as thick as Hans Blumenberg’s best, to which
they can in a sense be compared, although they lack the heavy phraseology
and are rather more sharply argued).
Perhaps due to too much exposure to the Frankfurt School in the early years
of my studies, I was surprised that some of the dangers inherent in a ‘science of
man’ are not discussed here: not so much the obvious cases such as the racism
in physical anthropology, as the sort of mood or situation so well captured by
La Mettrie when he wrote, “He who chooses man as an object of study must
expect to have man as an enemy.”¹ I’ll raise this again in my questions to the
author.
1 In the Acknowledgments, I was struck by the following statement: “In con-tinuing this project into the late 18tʰ and early 19tʰ centuries, my attentionhas turned to the human sciences, and I have been taken back to the politicaland intellectual interests of my student days in the 1970s, (…) Although I haven’t
exactly returned to these interests here—the nature of politics has changed so radi-
cally since then as to make that inconceivable—they have helped over the years to
shape my sense of what the point and value of intellectual enquiry is” (v). Could
you expand on this a bit? I found it compelling and it gives a sense of background
quite different from what readers who are always arguing about either your mi-
croanalyses (as compared to some other current scholar) or the big picture in your
project. Also, it hints at a sociopolitical dimension which isn’t really present in your
type of analysis, as far as I can tell. I have a similarly general (or non-historical)
question at the end, as you’ll see.
In the early to mid-1970s, I was in a reading group with others sympathetic
to Althusser. We read Bachelard, Koyré, Duhem, Foucault, Saussure, Jakob-
son, Levi-Strauss, and Lacan. One distinctive thing about Althusser’s reading
¹ J.O. de La Mettrie, Discours sur le bonheur, in La Mettrie,Œuvres philosophiques, ed. F. Markovits,
2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, coll. “Corpus”, 1987), II, 269.
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of Marx was its structuralism, which meant reading history was out as the
core of Marxism: the study of society was synchronic rather than diachronic.
When I subsequently came to think about these questions in the context of
the history and philosophy of science, starting a PhD on Bachelard in 1974, it
seemed that what I had read offfered an obvious way out of the prevalent in-
ternalist/externalist debate in the history of science. To think there was one
preferred way of pursuing the history of science (or intellectual history more
generally) was ridiculous. What resources one drew on, whether social or tech-
nical, whether long-term or short-term considerations, etc., was determined by
the kinds of questions that one was asking and what kinds of answers one was
seeking.This extends to the question of micro versus macro. One doesn’t do the
history of science per se, one uses the history of sceince to answer particular
well-formed questions. Without that one is just doing antiquarianism.
2 As regards this volume in relation to the series, could you situate it brieflyin the series and perhaps say a word on what happens next? I believe in oneof the volumes it is described as a 5-volume series and now as a 6-volume series?I thought of the volumes as chronological account of the emergence of a
scientific culture, but this has taken as more focused theme in the volumes, and
they are now on a temporally located theme. The fourth will be on science and
civilization between the Encyclopédie and WWI. It may be the last volume, but
it’s too early to say at the moment: I don’t have a manageable issue for post
WWI.
3 The birth of the human / social / moral sciences. How does your story fitwith the emergence of the Geistes- versus Naturwissenschaften distinc-tion (or with the two cultures distinction, which may not be synonymous with theformer)?
In your discussion of Feuerbach et al. as a kind of naturalization through history,
would you agree that naturalization and historicization come to mean much the
same thing (my formulation)?
Historicization is a form of naturalization on my definition because it takes
questions that would otherwise have been formulated in purely conceptual or
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doctrinal terms and poses them in away that makes empirical evidence relevant
to/crucial to answering them.
I haven’t thought about the Geistes-/Naturwissenschaften distinction yet. It
needs to be placed in the context of attempts to make use of/rescue a Kantian
conception of intellectual inquiry. I might deal with this in vol 4, but I’m not
sure yet.
4 Regarding some of the potential dangers in a science of man, I couldn’thelp but think of this great line by La Mettrie (in his work on moral phi-losophy): “He who chooses man as an object of study must expect to have man asan enemy.” Does this fit at all with your story? Any comment on it?
On the dangers of a science of man, one question I want to deal with in the
present volume concerns the shaping of the population into the kinds of person
who can occupy a scientifically-modelled form of civilization. The 1933 Science
of Man prospectus of the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the largest sources of
funding for the sciences in the U.S. at the time, sets out one explicit version of
such a programme:
Can man gain an intelligent control of his own powers? Can we develop so sound and
extensive a genetics that we can hope to breed, in the future, superior men? Can we ob-
tain enough knowledge of the physiology and psychobiology of sex that man can bring
this pervasive, highly important, and dangerous aspect of life under rational control?
Can we unravel the tangled problem of the endocrine glands, and develop, before it is
too late, a therapy for the whole range of mental and physical disorders which result
from glandular disturbances? Can we resolve the mysteries of the various vitamins so
that we can nurture a race sufficiently healthy and resistant? Can we release psychology
from its present confusion and ineffectiveness and shape it into a tool which every man
can use every day? Can man acquire enough knowledge of his own vital processes so
that we can hope to rationalize human behaviour? Can we, in short, create a new science
of man?
I think this brings out at least one set of dangers very strikingly: it is so
unself-conscious.
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5 Concerning Herder: he seems to be something of a hero of the story, op-posed or at least contrasted to both the crude reductionists like La Mettrie,and to figures whose ’apriorism’ leads them to adopt an eccentric or marginal at-titude to scientific practice, like Kant. Would you agree with this, and either way,
might you comment on the issue? (Similarly, I found interesting what you say
about Kant’s anthropology: could you expand on it and/or comment: you hint that
it has a never very well-defined status in his work; any thoughts also on how it
relates to the anthropology of the time?)
I see this question as one of the relation between science and the Kultur/Bild-
ung tradition. Allow me to draw on material from my forthcoming book in
answering your question.
Although the idea of Bildung finds its paradigm application in the realm of
the arts, this idea that it is the search for truth, not the truth itself, that is of
greatest value, fits the work of the scientist perfectly well. It offers a very dif-
ferent understanding of the value of scientific enquiry from what is in effect
the results- orientated conception of science that accompanies the 18ᵗʰ- and
19ᵗʰ-century notions of civilization with which we have been concerned, and
which Weimar intellectuals rejected.
In short, the Bildung-Kultur conception, by focusing on the practice of sci-
ence rather than its results, allows for the elevation of science to the highest
level of cultural achievement: the practice of science becomes a way of giving
one’s life a direction. But the situation is complex. In one respect, this concep-
tion can enhance the prospects of science as a worthwhile form of activity. The
idea of Bildung was a response to a set of older values, which contemporaries
characterized in terms of the idea of the Gelehrten, academic scholars.
R. Steven Turner has argued that there is a fundamental shift in German
intellectual culture with the concentration of scientific enquiry in the state-
funded universities from the beginning of the 19ᵗʰ century onwards. This shift,
which he terms the ‘Great Transition’, is one of the demise of traditional ideals
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of learnedness: erudition, eloquence, Latinity, and a polymathic command of a
common tradition of learning. The shift was consolidated in the early decades
of the 19ᵗʰ century, moving German intellectual culture from erudition, now
considered introverted and pointless, to functional expertise. Functional exper-
tise is of course supportive of a scientific culture, and there can be little doubt
that between the middle of the century and the outbreak of the First WorldWar
it was Germany, rather than Britain, that was at the forefront of scientific and
technological research.
But the same conception of Bildung also suggests a diametrically opposed
path, for the idea of Kultur undeniably also promotes an association of science
with politics and other ‘second-rank’ pursuits. In this case, any link between
science and civilization would not necessarily be to the benefit of either. Which
of the routes was followed depended on complex contextual circumstances, and
these questions become of particular significance in the wake of the First World
War, where the context in which enquiry was pursued was very different from
that of the second half of the 19ᵗʰ century.
The complexity of the post-war situation as it affected the standing of science
was shaped by the boycott of German andAustrian scientists from international
conferences (where much of science was conducted in this period) from 1919
to 1931, accompanied by the concomitant collapse of German as the ‘language
of science’. In the circumstances, we might expect any association between sci-
ence and civilization in the Germanophone world in the interwar years to be
far from straightforward, and somewhat different from that in other European
countries. But in the period up to 1914 there is, by comparison, more com-
mon ground with British and French notions of civilization, and, on the part
of the many British and French intellectuals, a sympathy with a cosmopolitan
understanding of Kultur, by contrast with the triumphalist and parochial un-
derstandings of civilization that had become prevalent in imperial powers such
as Britain.
6 How does your perspective on science fit with the Stanford School’s em-phasis on disunity? It seems related, or perhaps complementary to it.I don’t know who Stanford School are, but I don’t believe there are anyinternally-motivated reasons to accept the unity of the sciences. (I’m work-
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ing on the ideological origins of the unity of the sciences in the 19ᵗʰ century at
the moment). No one believes in unity in the context of explanation (evident in
the doctrine of ‘emergent properties’), and I don’t believe there are any other
issues. Ontological questions about ‘ultimate stuff’ is an absolute dead end and
its proponents should be forced to read Carnap until they get it out of their
systems.
Jean-Léon Gérôme, Diogène, 1860. The Walters Art Museum, Baltimore
(http://art.thewalters.org/detail/31957/diogenes/).
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